Ensuring the integrity of outsourced data is one of several functional requirements in cloud storage services, although designing an effective and secure public auditing scheme remains an ongoing research challenge. For example, a number of existing schemes are designed based on symmetric bilinear pairing, which are computationally expensive. While certificate-based auditing schemes can simplify certificate management and mitigate key escrow concern, such schemes are not popular in the literature. Therefore, we propose a lightweight certificate-based public/private auditing scheme based on asymmetric bilinear pairing for cloud storage. Specifically, we describe a new method of designing lightweight auditing schemes. Additionally, our proposed scheme is proven to be secure in the random oracle model. We then implement our scheme by using type D curve of the pairing-based library. The findings demonstrate that our auditing scheme significantly reduces client's computation cost in the tag-generation (TagGen) phase, particularly in comparison to several other competing schemes. For example, when the block size is 10 KB, our on-line computation cost in the TagGen phase takes only 0.45 seconds, while it requires at least 62.83 seconds in other schemes. Furthermore, the findings show that when the number of blocks is fixed, the on-line computation cost in our TagGen phase is constant despite varying file sizes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud storage is now a deeply entrenched practice in our society. However, there remains a number of issues and challenges that have not been resolved. For example, how do users ensure the integrity of the outsourced data, particularly in cases where the users may not have the complete copy The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Gautam Srivastava .
of the data on their local systems and devices? Potential solutions that have been presented in the literature include provable data possession (PDP) model [1] and proof of retrievability (POR) model [2] , [3] . In the PDP model, if the outsourced data successfully passes an audit without the user having to retrieve the data, then the user is assured of the data's integrity. For the POR model, the user can extract the data only when the outsourced data successfully passes an audit.
Generally speaking, there are two main phase in data integrity auditing, namely: TagGen and Proof phases. In the TagGen phase, the user generates the tags associated with the data, and uploads both data and tags to the cloud server. In the Proof phase, the auditor sponsors a challenge, the cloud server returns a response, and the auditor determines integrity of the outsourced data by verifying the validity of the response.
Furthermore, data integrity auditing can be broadly categorized into public auditing and private auditing, depending on whether public verifiability is supported. Private auditing schemes, such as those presented in [2] , [4] , are more efficient. However, unlike public auditing schemes, in private auditing schemes only the owner can audit the data, and the judge cannot intervene when a dispute occurs. Therefore, public auditing schemes are generally more practical.
Many public auditing schemes [2] , [5] - [8] are designed based on conventional public key infrastructure (PKI)-based cryptography. However, a key limitation of PKI-based auditing schemes is expensive certificate management, since the schemes require the use of certificates generated by some trusted third-party to bind the user's identity and public key. There have been attempts to design schemes that do not require such expensive certificate management, such as the identity-based PDP scheme of Wang et al. [9] . There have also been a large number of ID-based auditing schemes in the literature, such as those presented in [10] - [15] for different application scenarios.
Schemes based on certificateless cryptography [17] and certificate-based cryptography [18] , [19] have also been presented in the literature, designed to solve the key escrow problem [16] inherent in ID-based cryptography. Examples of certificateless auditing schemes include those of [20] - [24] . Certificate-based auditing schemes, on the other hand, appear to be significantly less popular. We are only aware of one such scheme [25] , which focuses only on private auditing. However, this particular scheme's efficiency is low.
While public auditing schemes allow third-party intervention (i.e., by a judge) in the case of a dispute, public auditing schemes are generally inefficient. This significantly limits its deployment in a real-world application and hence, interest in, such schemes. In other words, ''How do we minimize computation, communication, and storage overheads in public auditing schemes?'' is an open research issue [26] , [27] . In order to minimize the overheads associated with storage and/or communication, Shacham and Waters [2] proposed compact proofs of retrievability scheme to minimize storage space for tags. The approach of Shacham and Waters [2] also inspired the design of several other schemes in the literature [7] , [12] - [14] , [20] . In addition, to reduce the computation cost, most existing schemes support batch auditing and third-party auditing. A number of schemes achieve constant verification time in the proof phase [11] , [20] .
However, there are only a small number of schemes that had reduced computation cost in the tag-generation (TagGen) phase. According to prior research [1] , [14] , if 1% of the total blocks are tampered with, then the auditor can detect the misconduct with a 99% possibility by challenging 4.6% of the total blocks. Thus, the computation cost of the Proof phase is smaller than that of the TagGen phase. Furthermore, most user devices are resource-constrained mobile devices (e.g., Android and iOS devices) and improving efficiency [28] is an important research direction for cryptography researchers. Therefore, it is more intuitive to minimize the computation overhead during the TagGen phase. One could attempt to reduce the computation overhead in the TagGen phase by using a trusted third-party. For example, Li et al. [29] used a cloud audit server to generate tags of the data, on behalf of the user, before uploading to the cloud server. However, in this scheme, the cloud audit server can potentially reveal the user's data and secret key. Wang et al. [10] used a proxy to facilitate the user to generate tags, and the user only need to encrypt the data prior to sending it to the proxy to ensure data privacy. Shen et al. [30] proposed a lightweight auditing scheme by using a third-party medium to help the user to generate tags. In this scheme, the user blinds the data before sending to the third-party medium to ensure data privacy. Han et al. [31] proposed a lightweight auditing scheme without bilinear pairings for smart city. Their scheme allows a third-party auditor to generate tags for the data on behalf of the user, and preserve data privacy from the third-party auditor. Furthermore, all trusted third parties (i.e., cloud audit server, proxy, or some third-party entity) are assumed to be honest, in the sense that they will not corrupt the data, in the schemes of [10] , [29] - [31] . In other words, in these schemes the user will not be able to detect the thirdparty's misbehavior. Therefore, we need to be able to minimize computation cost of the TagGen phase without involving a third-party.
We also observe that in the literature, most pairing-based data integrity auditing schemes, such as those of [2] , [11] , [12] , [14] , [22] , [23] , are based on symmetric bilinear pairing, despite the acknowledgement that asymmetric bilinear pairing is more suited for data integrity auditing schemes [14] .
The above observations motivate our focus in this paper. Specifically, we design a certificate-based auditing scheme that has a reduced computation cost in the TagGen phase without involving a third party. We are also inspired by Zhang et al.'s certificate-based signature scheme [32] , and hence our proposed scheme is also certificate-based. We leverage the fact that a user generally has more information than the auditor, and therefore divide the Proof phase into PublicVerify phase and PrivateVerify phase. Therefore, our scheme is a public/private auditing scheme. We also acknowledge that most user devices are resource-constrained, and thus ensure that the user side's requirement is relatively lightweight. Using specific information of the user, we manage to reduce users' computation cost in the TagGen phase. Furthermore, the public/private auditing scheme also reduces the computation cost of the user in the Proof phase. In other words, our contribution in this paper is a lightweight certificate-based public/private auditing scheme, based on asymmetric bilinear pairing. VOLUME 8, 2020 To facilitate understanding of our proposed scheme, we will introduce relevant background materials (e.g., bilinear pairing, co-computational Diffie-Hellman problem, and certificate-based signature) in Section II. We then introduce the public/private auditing model and certificate-based auditing model in Section III, and present our proposed certificate-based public/private auditing scheme in Section IV. We prove the security of the proposed scheme in Section V, and implement our scheme using type D curve of the pairing-based library in Section VI. A comparative summary of the proposed schemes and several others are presented in Section VII. It is shown in this section that our auditing scheme outperforms other schemes, in terms of achieving reduced computation cost for users during TagGen and without involving a third-party. The analysis also shows that when the block size is 10 KB, our on-line computation cost during TagGen is only 0.45 seconds, unlike the other schemes (between 62.83 and 250.29 seconds). Furthermore, if we fix the block numbers, the on-line computation cost during TagGen in our scheme is constant even when the file sizes change. In the last section, we present our discussion and conclusion.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We will now review bilinear pairing [8] , [11] , [33] , [34] , co-computational Diffie-Hellman problem [35] , pseudo-random function, pseudo-random permutation, certificate-based signature [18] , [19] , [32] , forking lemma [36] in Sections II-A to II-E, respectively.
A. BILINEAR PAIRING
Let q be a prime, G 1 , G 2 , and G T be three cyclic groups with order q. Let G 1 and G 2 be written additively with respective generators P 1 and P 2 , and G T be written multiplicatively. The map e : G 1 × G 2 → G T is a bilinear pairing, only when the following three properties are satisfied.
(1). Bilinearity: For any a, b ∈ Z * q , e(a · P 1 , b · P 2 ) = e(P 1 , P 2 ) ab holds.
(2). Non-degeneracy: e(P 1 , P 2 ) = 1.
(3). Computablity: For anyP 1 ∈ G 1 ,P 2 ∈ G 2 , there exists a polynomial time algorithm to calculate e(P 1 ,P 2 ) efficiently.
If G 1 = G 2 , then it is said to be symmetric bilinear pairing; otherwise, it is said to be asymmetric bilinear pairing. Furthermore, asymmetric bilinear pairings can be categorized into whether there is an efficiently computable homomorphism : G 2 → G 1 , or not.
B. CO-COMPUTATIONAL DIFFIE-HELLMAN PROBLEM
Let G 1 , G 2 , P 1 , P 2 , q be the parameters described in Subsection II-A and Q 1 = a · P 1 , Q 2 = b · P 2 be two random elements with a, b ∈ Z * q unknown. The co-computational Diffie-Hellman (co-CDH) problem [35] is to calculate
At the time of this research, there is no efficient polynomial time algorithm to solve the co-CDH problem. That is to say, let the probability of a polynomial time algorithm solving the co-CDH problem, ε, is negligible.
C. PSEUDO-RANDOM FUNCTION AND PSEUDO-RANDOM PERMUTATION 1) PSEUDO-RANDOM FUNCTION
This algorithm takes α ∈ Z * q , β ∈ N * as input and returns β different pseudo-random numbers from Z * q . We denote this algorithm as ϕ(α, β) :
2) PSEUDO-RANDOM PERMUTATION
This algorithm takes α ∈ Z * q , β ∈ N * , γ ∈ N * as input and returns a sequence with β different pseudo-random numbers from Z * γ . We denote this algorithm as π(α, β, γ ) :
D. CERTIFICATE-BASED SIGNATURE
There are three entities and five algorithms in a typical certificate-based signature scheme [18] , [19] , [32] . The three entities are the signer, the verifier, and the certifier, and the five algorithms are Setup, SignerKeyGen, Certify, CBSign, CBVeri. The certifier executes the Setup algorithm, and outputs the the global parameters and the global secret key. The signer executes SignerKeyGen algorithm, and outputs his/her secret key sk and public key PK . In the Certify algorithm, the certifier generates the certificate Cert using the signer's public key and identity ID, prior to sending it to signer via a secret channel. In the CBSign algorithm, given a message m, the signer computes the signature σ = CBSign(sk, Cert, m).
In the CBVeri algorithm, given PK , ID, m and σ , the verifier computes the value of CBVeri(ID, PK , m, σ ). It outputs 1/0 based on whether or not the signature is valid.
E. FORKING LEMMA
The forking lemma [36] . Given only the public data as input, if a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine can find a valid signature (σ 1 , h, σ 2 ) on message m with a non-negligible probability, then this machine can output another valid signature (σ 1 , h , σ 2 ) on the same m by replaying itself with the same random tape and a different oracle with a non-negligible probability. Here, h is the hash value of (m, σ 1 ) and σ 2 is dependent only on σ 1 . Note that the forking lemma is appropriate for the security proof of both the signature and auditing schemes, as the auditing scheme's framework is based on signature.
III. MODELS
In this section, we introduce the public/private auditing model, the system model and the security model of the certificate-based auditing.
A. Public/Private Auditing Model
Data integrity auditing is either public auditing or private auditing. In the latter, it is the user's duty to audit the integrity of the outsourced data. Private auditing schemes are more efficient, but the judge cannot intervene when a dispute occurs. This is clearly not desirable in e-commerce applications. In public auditing schemes, both the user and the auditor can audit the integrity of the outsourced data. When a dispute occurs, anyone can intervene as a judge. Therefore, public auditing schemes are more geared for practical deployment. However, such schemes are generally much less efficient. In existing public auditing schemes, both users and auditors have the same audit stages. However, the user clearly has more information than the auditor. So, we divide the audit phase into the PrivateVerify and PublicVerify phases. The client executes PrivateVerify, which is more efficient due to the fact that the user has more information. The auditor executes PublicVerify when a dispute occurs or when the user is not available to perform the audit. The PublicVerify phase is executed as the audit phase in existing public auditing schemes. Thus, we refer to such auditing scheme as public/private auditing schemes.
B. SYSTEM MODEL OF CERTIFICATE-BASED PDP
There are four entities and eight algorithms in the certificate-based PDP model. The four entities are the certifier, the cloud server, the user (also commonly referred to client in the literature), and the auditor. The certifier is an independent trusted third-party, whose duty is to produce its own system parameters, and generate client's certificate from his/her identity and public key. The cloud server is an entity with significant storage space and computation resources, and provides storage services for the client. The client is generally resource-constrained, and hence the need to outsource data storage to the cloud server. The auditor is an independent trusted third-party. With the client's authorization, the auditor checks the integrity of the outsourced data and returns the result to the client.
Compared with the other PDP models, our proposed scheme is designed to achieve the benefits in both public and private auditing by dividing the ProofVerify phase into Pri-vateVerify phase and PublicVerify phase. In order to improve audit efficiency, the client executes the PrivateVerify phase to audit the outsourced data. When a dispute happens or when the client is not available to perform the audit, the auditor is authorized to audit the outsourced data by using PublicVerify. The eight algorithms are Init, ClientKeyGen, Certify, TagGen, Chall, ProofGen, PrivateVerify, and PublicVerify in the certificate-based PDP model. Fig. 1 presents the system model of certificate-based PDP, and the algorithms are also explained in detail as follows.
The Init algorithm is performed by the certifier (see step 1 of Fig. 1 ). Given the security parameters, it generates the global parameters gp and global secret key gsk. The certifier keeps gsk secret, and publishes gp.
The ClientKeyGen algorithm is performed by the client (see steps 2 and 3 of Fig. 1 ). Given gp, the client picks his/her secret key sk randomly, and computes the corresponding public key PK . The client keeps his/her sk secret, and sends his/her PK and identity ID to the certifier.
The Certify algorithm is executed by the certifier (see steps 4 and 5 of Fig. 1 ). Given the client's ID and PK , the certifier generates the certificate Cert, and sends Cert to the client via a private channel. Upon receiving Cert, the client checks the validity of Cert. The TagGen algorithm is performed by the client and the cloud server (see steps 6 and 7 of Fig. 1 ). Given a file F, the client generates the tags by using his/her secret key sk and certificate Cert, and sends the data and tags to cloud server. The cloud server stores the data and tags.
The Chall algorithm is performed by the client (see step 8 of Fig. 1 ). The client sponsors a challenge, and sends it to the cloud server.
The ProofGen algorithm is performed by the cloud server (see step 9 of Fig. 1 ). Given the challenge, the cloud server responds it.
The PrivateVerify algorithm is performed by the client (see step 10 of Fig. 1 ). Given the response, the client checks its validity. Upon receiving the response from the cloud sever, the client checks the validity of the response.
The PublicVerify algorithm is performed by the auditor (see steps 11 to 18 of Fig. 1 ). There are only two cases where this algorithm will be activated. The auditor performs case 1 when a dispute occurs, and case 2 when the client is not available for audit. Case 1 (see steps 11 to 13). Given the forwarded response from the client, the auditor solves the dispute and returns the result.
Case 2 (see steps 14 to 18). Upon receiving the authorization from the client, the auditor sponsors a challenge, and the cloud server responds it. Then the client checks its validity, and sends the result to client.
C. SECURITY MODEL OF CERTIFICATE-BASED PDP
Similar to certificate-based signature model, there are two adversaries in certificate-based PDP, i.e., the public key replacement adversary and the malicious certifier adversary.
If an adversary has the ability to select clients' identities and replace the public keys at his/her will, but it cannot have access to the global secret key, then we say this adversary is the public key replacement adversary 1 .
We say that a certificate-based PDP scheme is (q, ε 1 ) secure against public key replacement adversary 1 , if the probability ε 1 of the adversary 1 winning the following game by making at mostueries is negligible.
The challenger performs the Setup phase to generate gp, gsk and send gp to 1 . Then, 1 adaptively submits ClientKeyGen queries, Client secret key query, Public key replace queries, Certify queries, and TagGen queries to and obtains the corresponding value. Here, the queries are described in the proof of Theorem 1 in section 5. Finally, 1 wins the game if he/she successfully forges a valid response resp * = {F * 0 , F * 1 , F * 2 , . . . , F * s−1 , T * } for client ID * on the challenge chal * under the public key PK * in the Forgery phase. Here, ID * has not been submitted to the Certify query, and (ID * , l, F * l ) has not been submitted to the TagGen query, where l ∈ L * , and L * is generated by chal * .
If an adversary can successfully obtain the global secret key and attempt to impersonate the user, but it cannot replace the public key, then we say this adversary is the malicious certifier adversary.
We say that a certificate-based PDP scheme is (q, ε 2 ) secure against a malicious certifier adversary 2 if the probability ε 2 of the adversary winning the following game by making at mostueries is negligible.
The challenger performs the Setup phase to generate gp, gsk and send them to 2 . Then, 2 adaptively submits ClientKeyGen queries, Client secret key query, Certify queries, and TagGen queries to and obtains the corresponding value. Here, the queries are described in the proof of Theorem 2 in Section 5. Finally, 2 wins the game if he/she successfully forges a valid response resp
for client ID # on the challenge chal # under the public key PK # in the Forgery phase. Here, PK # is the output of ClientKeyGen query, and (ID # , l, F # l ) has not been submitted to the TagGen query, where l ∈ L # , and L # is generated by chal # .
If a certificate-based PDP scheme can resist both the public key replacement adversary and the malicious certifier adversary, then we say the scheme is secure.
IV. OUR PROPOSED CERTIFICATE-BASED PDP SCHEME
Our proposed scheme comprises Init, ClientKeyGen, Certify, TagGen, Chall, ProofGen, PrivateVerify, and PublicVerify. These eight algorithms are also described below.
A. INIT
This algorithm is performed by the certifier. Let parameters
{0, 1} * → G 1 be three hash functions, and the first two be ordinary hash functions, and the last one be the map to point hash function. Let
The certifier chooses a random number gsk ∈ Z * q as the global secret key, and calculates P pub = gsk · P 2 . Let CBSign(·, ·, ·) and CBVeri(·, ·, ·, ·) be the certificate-based sign and verify algorithms described in Section II-D. For example, the certificate-based sign and verify algorithms can be Zhang et al.'s certificate-based signature [32] . Then, the certifier publishes the global param-
ϕ(·, ·), π(·, ·, ·), CBSign(·, ·, ·), CBVeri(·, ·, ·, ·)}, and keeps the global secret key gsk secret.
B. CLIENTKEYGEN
This algorithm is performed by the client. The client chooses a random number sk ∈ Z * q as his/her secret key, calculates PK = sk · P 2 as his/her public key, and sends his/her identity ID and public key PK to the certifier.
C. CERTIFY
This algorithm is performed by the certifier. Upon receiving ID and PK , the certifier chooses a random number r ∈ Z * q , computes CERT = r · P 2 , cert = r + gsk · h(ID||PK ||CERT ) mod q. Then, the certifier sends Cert = (CERT , cert) to the client via a private channel. Upon receiving Cert, the client checks whether cert · P 2 = CERT + h(ID||PK ||CERT ) · P pub holds. If the equation holds, then the client accepts Cert otherwise, it rejects.
D. TAGGEN
There are 7 steps in this algorithm. Steps 1-6 are executed by the client, and step 7 is executed by the cloud server. Note that step 1 can be precomputed off-line.
2) STEP 2
Let |q| be the bit-length of q, and ζ = |q| − 1. Given a file with file size fz, appends some bits ''0'' followed by a ζ -bits integer (fz (mod s·ζ )) to the end of the given file (The method is similar to that of secure hash function [38] ), so that file size of the padded file F is the multiple of (s · ζ ). Then, we pick a file name FN ∈ Z q for the given file F randomly.
3) STEP 3
Divides the padded file F into n equal blocks with block size (s · ζ )-bits, and divides each blocks into s equal sections. i.e.,
4) STEP 4
Computes the signature σ C = CBSign(sk, Cert,
. Note that any secure signature algorithm can be used in this step.
5) Step 5
Computes ω = h (ID||PK ||P pub ), and for i = 1 to n, i = H (FN ||i||U ),
Uploads the data and tags {F i , T i }(1 ≤ i ≤ n), FN , ID, PK , U , and σ C to the cloud server. Stores FN , n, s, ρ, and deletes
Upon receiving {F i , T i }(1 ≤ i ≤ n), and FN , ID, PK , U , σ C , the cloud server stores them.
E. CHALL
The client picks two random elements ρ , ρ ∈ Z * q , a random integer ξ ∈ N * , sponsors the challenge chal = (ρ , ρ , ξ ) to the cloud server.
F. PROOFGEN
Received the challenge chal, the cloud server computes L =
Upon receiving resp, the client computes (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x s−1 ) = ϕ(ρ, s − 1), L = π(ρ , ξ, n + 1), and {a l } l∈L = ϕ(ρ , ξ ) ∈ (Z * q ) ξ , checks the validity of T using equation (1).
If the equation holds, then the file is not corrupted, otherwise, the file is corrupted.
According to Equation (2), we know that Equation (1) is correct.
There are only two cases where this algorithm is used. The auditor performs case 1 when a dispute occurs, and case 2 when the client is not available for audit. Case 1. Given the forwarded response resp from the client, the auditor then computes L = π(ρ , ξ, n + 1), and {a l } l∈L = ϕ(ρ , ξ ) ∈ (Z * q ) ξ , and checks the validity of T using Equation (3) .
According to Equation (1), and U j = x j · P 1 we know that Equation (3) is correct.
Case 2. Upon receiving the authorization from the client, the auditor sponsors a challenge chal to the cloud server, and the cloud server responds with resp to the auditor by using the method described in the ProofGen phase (see Section IV), The auditor checks the validity of resp using the method described in case 1 of the PublicVerify phase (see Section IV). The results will be sent by the auditor to the client.
Furthermore, our scheme supports batch auditing for different files. For example, if there are two files F =
. . ,F i,s−1 )} 1≤i≤ñ with file name FN and FN respectively. Therefore, their tags are
In the ProofGen phase, the cloud server computes {F j } 0≤j≤s−1 = { l∈L a l · F lj + l∈Lã l ·F lj } 0≤j≤s−1 , 0 ≤ j ≤ s − 1,T = l∈L a l · T l + l∈Lã l ·T l , and sends the response resp = {{F j } 0≤j≤s−1 ,T } to the client. In the PrivateVerify phase, the client checks the validity of T by using the following equation.
In Case 1 of the PublicVerify phase, the auditor checks the validity ofT by using the following equation. e(T , P 2 )
V. SECURITY PROOF
In this section, inspired by [32] , [37] we demonstrate that our scheme is secure by using Theorems 1 and 2.
Theorem 1: Our scheme can resist the public key replacement adversary if the co-CDH problem [35] of the group G 1 and G 2 is hard.
Proof: Let (P 1 , P 2 , a · P 1 , b · P 2 ) be a random instance of co-CDH problem, 1 be a public key replacement adversary, and be a challenger we constructed. If 1 can forge a valid response with a nonnegligible probability ε 1 , then can try to output a · b · P 1 , by using the following methods with a nonnegligible probability.
First, we give the framework of the proof. sets P pub = b · P 2 and ID O as the challenge identity, then sends gp to 1 . 1 adaptively submits queries to , to be answered by . Note that sets a · P 1 as a part of the output of H (·) query with probability 1 − λ. Then, 1 successfully forges a valid response with probability ε 1 . uses the Forking lemma [36] on h(·) query and 1 outputs another valid response. solves the co-CDH problem by using the two responses forged by 1 . In other words, outputs the value of a · b · P 1 with probability ε 1 . The value of ε 1 is computed at the end of the proof. The detailed proof is as follows.
Setup: sets P pub = b · P 2 , and sends gp = {G 1 , G 2 , G T , P 1 , P 2 , q, e, h(·), h (·), H (·), P pub , ϕ(·, ·), π (·, ·, ·), CBSign (·, ·), CBVeri(·, ·, ·, ·)} to 1 . picks a challenge identity ID O and answers the following queries.
h(·) Query: With the query message {ID η , PK η , CERT η }, checks whether there is a tuple {ID η , PK η , CERT η , h η } in L h . If so, returns h η to 1 ; otherwise, picks a random number h η ∈ Z * q , adds {ID η , PK η , CERT η , h η } into the list L h , returns h η to 1 .
h (·) Query: With the query message {ID η , PK η , P pub }, checks whether there is a tuple {ID η , PK η , P pub , ω η } in L h . If so, returns ω η to 1 ; otherwise, picks a random number ω η ∈ Z * q , adds {ID η , PK η , P pub , ω η } into the list L h , returns ω η to 1 .
H (·) Query: With the query message {FN , θ, U }, checks whether there is a tuple {θ, c θ , z θ , Z θ } in L H . If so, returns θ = Z θ − F θ 0 · − s−1 j=1 F θ j · U j to 1 ; otherwise, picks a random bit c θ ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr[c θ = 0] = λ, (0 < λ < 1, and note that the value of λ can be regarded as the probability of ''coin tossing'', i.e., λ = 1/2), picks a random number 1 . ClientKeyGen Query: With the query message {ID η }, checks whether {ID η , sk η , PK η } exists in L k . If so, returns PK η to 1 ; otherwise, selects a random number sk η ∈ Z * q , computes PK η = sk η · P 2 , adds {ID η , sk η , PK η } into L k , returns PK η to 1 .
Client Secret Key Query: With the query message {ID η }, checks the list L k and returns sk η to 1 .
Public Key Replace Query: With the query message {ID η , PK η }, checks whether there is a tuple {ID η , sk η , PK η } in the list L k . If so, sets PK η = PK η , sk η =⊥; otherwise, adds {ID η , ⊥, PK η } into L k . Certify Query: With the query message {ID η , PK η }, checks whether ID η = ID O . If so, aborts; otherwise, checks whether {ID η , PK η } exists in L c . If not, chooses two random numbers h η , cert η ∈ Z * q , computes CERT η = cert η · P 2 − h η · b · P 2 , checks whether {ID η , PK η , CERT η } exists in L h . If the latter is true, then picks another cert η ∈ Z * q until there is no collision. will also add {ID η , PK η , CERT η , h η } into L h , add {ID η , PK η , CERT η , cert η } into L c , and return Cert η = (CERT η , cert η ) to 1 .
TagGen Query: With the query message {ID η , F θ }, makes the H (·) query and obtains {θ, c θ , z θ , Z θ } from L H . If c θ = 1, then aborts; otherwise, computes T θ = z θ · (ω η · PK η + CERT η + h η · P pub ), and sends {θ, F θ , T θ } to 1 .
Forgery: Finally, 1 outputs a valid forgery response resp * = {F * 0 , F * 1 , F * 2 , . . . , F * s−1 , T * } of a client ID * on subset L * with probability ε 1 , where L * is generated by challenge chal * . Here, ID * has not been submitted to the Certify query, and (ID * , l, F * l ) has not been submitted to the TagGen query, where l ∈ L * , and L * is generated by chal * .
Then, uses the Forking lemma [36] on h(·) query, and 1 outputs another valid forgery response resp * * = {F * 0 , F * 1 , F * 2 , . . . , F * s−1 , T * * } of the same client on the same subset L * .
Solving Co-CDH Problem: If the client's identity is actually ID O , and at least one of c l = 0(l ∈ L * ), then looks up L h , L h , L H and obtains e(T * , P 2 ) = e(
i.e.,
). Probability: According to the game, can compute a · b · P 1 , iff, the following three events happen.
A: does not abort in the Certify query. B: 1 outputs a valid forgery response with at least one of c l = 0(l ∈ L * ).
C: WhenB happens, 1 outputs the valid forgery response with the identity ID O .
We have pr
where q h and q C are the number of h query and Certify query respectively, |L * | is the number of elements in set L * . so, the probability of solving the co-CDH problem is
Theorem 2: Our proposed certificate-based PDP scheme can resist the malicious certifier adversary if the co-CDH problem [35] of the group G 1 and G 2 is hard.
Proof: Let (P 1 , P 2 , a · P 1 , b · P 2 ) be a random instance of co-CDH problem, 2 be a malicious certifier adversary, and be a challenger we constructed. If 2 can forge a valid response with a nonnegligible probability ε 2 , then can try to output a · b · P 1 by using the following methods with a nonnegligible probability.
First, we give the framework of the proof. The sets ID O be the challenge identity, then sends gp, gsk to 2 . The 2 adaptively submits queries to , and answers them. Note that sets a · P 1 as a part of the output of H (·) query with probability 1−λ, and PK η = b·P 2 as the output of ClientKey-Gen query when ID η = ID O . Then, 2 successfully forges a valid response with probability ε 2 .
solves the co-CDH problem by using the response forged by 2 . that is to say, outputs the value of a · b · P 1 with probability ε 2 . The value of ε 2 are computed in the end of the proof. The detail proof can be seen as follows.
Setup: picks a random number gsk ∈ Z * q as the global secret key, computes P pub = gsk · P 2 , and returns the global public parameters gp = {G 1 , G 2 , G T , P 1 , P 2 , q, e, h(·), h (·) , H (·), P pub , ϕ(·, ·), π(·, ·, ·), CBSign(·, ·), CBVeri(·, ·, ·, ·)} and the global secret key gsk to 2 . picks a challenge identity ID O and answers the following queries. Note that h (·) and H (·) queries are executed as those in the proof of Theorem 1.
ClientKeyGen Query: With the query message {ID η }, checks whether {ID η , sk η , PK η } exists in L k . If so, returns PK η to 2 ; otherwise, if ID η = ID O , selects a random number sk η ∈ Z * q , computes PK η = sk η · P 2 , adds {ID η , sk η , PK η } into L k , returns PK η to 2 ; otherwise, sets PK η = b · P 2 , adds {ID η , ⊥, PK η } into L k , returns PK η to 2 .
Client Secret Key Query: With the query message {ID η }, checks whether ID η = ID O . If so, aborts; otherwise, checks the list L k and returns sk η to 2 .
Certify Query: holds two list L c and L h , which are initialized to be empty. With the query message {ID η , PK η }, checks whether {ID η , PK η } exists in L c . If so, {ID η , PK η } is in L h too; returns Cert η = (CERT η , cert η ) and the hash value h η of {ID η , PK η , CERT η } to 2 . Otherwise chooses a random number r η ∈ Z * q , computes CERT η = r η · P 2 , picks a random number 
Forgery: Finally, 2 outputs a valid forgery response
} of a client on subset L # with probability ε 2 , where L # is generated by challenge chal # . Here, PK # is the output of ClientKeyGen query, and (ID # , l, F # l ) has not been submitted to the TagGen query, where l ∈ L # , and L # is generated by chal # .
Solving Co-CDH Problem: If the client's identity is ID O , and at least one of c l = 0(l ∈ L # ), then looks up L h , L h , L H and obtains
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In other words, we have the following:
. Probability: According to the process, can compute a · b · P 1 , iff, the following three events happen.
E: does not abort in Client secret key query. F: 2 outputs a valid forgery response with at least one of c l = 0(l ∈ L # ).
G: WhenF happens, 2 outputs the valid forgery response with the identity ID O .
pr[Ĝ | (Ê ∧F)] ≥ 1 q C , where q ckg , q csk and q C are the number of ClientKeyGen query, Client secret key query and Certify query respectively, |L # | is the number of elements in set L # . so, the probability of solves the co-CDH problem is
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we implemented our auditing scheme on a notebook with the following specifications: Lenovo with an I7-6500U 2.59GHz processor, 8G bytes memory and Window 10 operating system), a Workstation 8.0 virtual machine (with the Ubuntu operating system), and using pairing-based library (version 0.5.12) [39] .
A. CURVE SELECTION
There are seven types of curves in pairing-based library (version 0.5.12) [39] . Types A, B, C, and E curves are for symmetric pairings, and Types D, F and G curves are for asymmetric pairings. When the order q of groups is around 160 bits, Lynn [40] suggested a field size of G 1 in each type of curves -see also TABLE 1. According to TABLE 5 in Section VII-C, the size of tags mainly depends on the size of G 1 . Therefore, the asymmetric pairing is a good choice for minimizing storage space and communication cost. We will omit operations with minimal computation costs, and there remains eight operations in our scheme to be considered. These eight operations are SM 1 , PA 1 , H 1 , SM 2 , PA 2 , SM T , PA T , Pair. SM i (i = 1, 2, T ) refers to scalar multiplication operation in group G i , PA i (i = 1, 2, T ) refers to point addition operation in group G i , H 1 denotes map-to-point hash function in group G 1 , and Pair denotes bilinear paring operation. Furthermore, these eight operations are the main operations of the schemes reviewed in Section VII-B (as shown in TABLE 4) . Note that there are seven type curves in pairing-based library (version 0.5.12) [39] , and Types B and C are not implementable [39] . So, we implement those operations in each type of curves, and evaluate their runtime - see TABLE 2 .
From TABLE 4, we observe that the computation costs in the TagGen phase mainly depends on those of operations in G 1 . Furthermore, computation costs introduced in the TagGen phase are the main costs for the data integrity auditing schemes. According to the runtime summarized in TABLE 2, it is clear that the asymmetric pairing is a good choice for minimizing computation cost. So, the data integrity auditing schemes based on asymmetric pairing are more practical. Therefore, we will next describe the implementation our scheme using Type D curve (d159.param).
B. IMPLEMENTATION
We fixed a 1 MB file, and increased the block size from 0.3KB to 45KB. As shown in Fig. 2 , the on-line time cost in the TagGen phase is only 0.45 seconds with a block size of 10 KB, and the time decreases as the block size increases. Compared with the time cost of 157 seconds for all block sizes in [14] , our results are significantly more promising. According to prior studies [1] , [14] , we selected 4.6% of the entire blocks to sponsor a challenge. Therefore, the time cost of private/public verify phases is less than that of the TagGen phase -see Fig. 2 , particularly when the block size is less than 10 KB. When the block size is larger than 10 KB, the time cost of private/public verify phases becomes a little bigger than the actual value, which is because the number of challenging blocks becomes too small and we round it up. Fig. 6 depicts the findings for the large file of 6 MB in size. We fixed the block numbers as ''10,000, 5,000, 1,000, and 500'', increased the file size from 0.2MB to 6MB, and investigated the on-line time cost introduced in the TagGen phase (as shown in Fig. 3 ). As shown in Fig. 3 , we can observe that the on-line time cost in the TagGen phase is determined by the number of blocks, rather than the file size.
VII. COMPARATIVE SUMMARY
Now, we will compare our scheme with seven existing PDP schemes.
A. PROPERTIES
We can observe from TABLE 3 that our proposed certificated-based PDP scheme not only removes the certificated verify phase in PKI-based PDP scheme, but also addresses the key escrow problem in ID-based PDP scheme. In order to reduce the computation overhead in TagGen, we proposed a certificate-based public/private auditing scheme. In our scheme, the client has more information; thus, it can privately verify the response resp with a lower computation cost. When a dispute occurs, the client authorizes the auditor to publicly verify the response resp to resolve the dispute. Furthermore, the client can authorize the auditor to publicly verify the response resp when he/she is not available (e.g., off-line). Clearly, PublicVerify introduces additional computation cost. Furthermore, we split TagGen into on-line and off-line phases. The client can pre-compute in the TagGen phase for improved performance. 
B. COMPUTATION COSTS
A summary of the computation costs of our scheme with that of seven other PDP schemes [2] , [11] , [12] , [14] , [22] , [23] , [25] is presented in TABLE 4. Although the seven other schemes are based on symmetric pairing, we analyzed their operations with asymmetric pairing of Type D curve (d159.param). From TABLE 2, one can observe that these seven schemes are more ineffective if the analysis is based on symmetric pairing. In order to avoid the hash value stored attack, we omit the hash function for data of reference [12] in TABLEs 4 and 5. In TABLE 4, n, s, c is the number of the block, the section, and the challenged block respectively, n and c are the special case with s = 1, and k is the attribute number described in [14] .
FIGUREs 4, 5, and 6 also describe the comparison reported in TABLE 4. As discussed earlier, we implemented our scheme using Type D curve. We calculated the computational costs in the seven other schemes using TABLEs 2 and 4 without taking the Sign operation into account for simplicity. The findings are presented in FIGUREs 4, 5, and 6. As the block size in [11] , [22] , [23] , [25] are constant (i.e., 160 bits), we do not describe them in the figures. However, we do discuss them below. Note that the computation costs of the scheme in [14] (see FIGUREs 4, 5, and 6) are less than those in [14] . Thus, we set k = 1 instead of 3.
In FIGURE 4 , we fixed the file size to 1 MB and compared the computation cost in the TagGen phase with different block sizes. The computation costs of the schemes in [11] , [22] , [23] , [25] are constant at 250.296 seconds, 128.448 seconds, 128.455 seconds, 128.448 seconds respectively. From  FIGURE 4 , we can see that our computation costs in the TagGen phase is much lower than those of other schemes. For example, when the block size is 10 KB, our computation cost in the on-line TagGen phase is only 0.45 seconds, compared with that about 62.83 seconds in the schemes in [2] , [12] , [14] . In FIGURE 5 , we fixed the block number to 5,000 and compared the on-line computation cost in the TagGen phase with different file sizes. Again, since the block sizes in the schemes of [11] , [22] , [23] , [25] are constant at 160 bits, the block number of those schemes cannot be fixed at 5,000 blocks. Clearly, the computation costs of those schemes increase as file size increases. As shown in FIGURE 5 , the computation costs of the schemes in [2] , [12] , [14] increase as the file size increases, which is almost 400 seconds when the file size is 6 MB. However, in the TagGen phase of our scheme, the on-line computation cost is almost constant to 21.8 seconds, and the total computation cost linearly increases, but very slowly. The total computation cost in the TagGen phase of our scheme is estimated to be 34.6 seconds when the file size is 1 GB.
In FIGURE 6 , we set c = 0.046n and file size is 6MB. Then, we compared the computation cost in the ProofVerify phase with different block sizes. The computation costs of the schemes in [11] , [22] , [23] , [25] are constant at 0.022 seconds, 18.236 seconds, 18.239 seconds, 18.235 seconds, respectively. We also remark that the computation cost of the scheme in [11] is not related to the file size. From FIGURE 6, we can see that our computation costs in the PrivateVerify phase is much lower than those of the other schemes with the exception of [11] , and the computation costs of PublicVerify are the same for the schemes in [2] , [12] , [14] . However, the computation cost in the TagGen phase of the scheme in [11] is the highest.
C. STORAGE AND COMMUNICATION COSTS
A comparative summary of the storage space and communication costs for all eight schemes is presented in TABLE 5, and we can see that the communication cost of our scheme is lower than those of the seven other schemes in the Chall phase. FIGURE 7 also shows the storage costs of TABLE 5 in the TagGen phase. As the block sizes of the schemes in [11] , [22] , [23] , [25] are constant at 160 bits, we do not describe them in FIGURE 7 . However, we can observe that the storage costs of the schemes in [11] , [22] , [23] , [25] are 2.0002MB, 2.4MB, 2.0005MB, 2MB, respectively. For simplicity, we omit the size of sign in TABLE 5 for the schemes in [2] , [11] , [14] , and set k = 1 for the scheme in [14] . Let size of the file be 1MB, and file section, G 1 and Z * q be all 160 bits. We used Type D curve (d159.param) and point compression technology. The findings reported in FIGURE 7 show that our storage costs in the TagGen phase is as same as those of the scheme in [2] , and are much lower than those of the remaining schemes except [12] . However, computation costs in the TagGen phase of the schemes in [2] , [12] are much higher than those of our scheme. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN ISSUES
Data integrity auditing is one important approach to ensure the integrity of outsourced data in cloud storage. Such approach will be increasingly important as more data are being outsourced and stored at the cloud or offshore locations. However, the TagGen phase in data integrity auditing schemes is usually the cause of inefficiency. In addition, most existing schemes are based on symmetric bilinear pairing, and there is a lack of certificate-based auditing schemes. Therefore, in this paper we presented our lightweight certificate-based public/private auditing scheme based on asymmetric bilinear pairing. Such a scheme can be used to ensure the integrity of data outsourced to the cloud for storage. We then evaluated both the security and the performance of our scheme. In comparison to seven other existing auditing schemes, our auditing scheme has a significant reduced computation cost for the client at TagGen, without relying on a third-party. When the block size is 10 KB, our on-line computation cost in the TagGen phase is only 0.45 seconds, while it needs about 62.83 to 250.29 seconds in other schemes. Furthermore, if we fix the blocks numbers, the on-line computation cost at Taggen is constant even when file size changes.
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